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ABSTRACT 
 
A unitary theory of perpetration is one that does not espouse different 
legal standards for different forms of participating in crime. In this 
Article, I pay homage to Professor Damaška’s influence on my work and 
career by reiterating my earlier arguments for a unitary theory of 
perpetration in international criminal law. Whereas my earlier work 
defended the unitary theory in abstract terms then for international 
criminal law in particular, this Article looks to the history of the unitary 
theory in five national systems that have abandoned differentiated systems 
like that currently in force internationally in favor of a unitary variant. 
Curiously, as things transpire, the reasons Norway, Denmark, Italy, 
Austria and Brazil dispensed with the types of differentiated system 
currently in force in international criminal law are strangely familiar to 
those working in international criminal justice today. The eerie sense of 
déjà vu that arises from reading these histories suggests that, potentially, 
the unitary theory may have real potential as a way through many of the 
key points of conceptual impasse that presently characterize this aspect of 
the field. In this respect, the Article seeks to contribute an historical 
perspective to a burgeoning dialogue about forms of blame attribution 
internationally by again questioning whether the great struggle with 
“modes of liability” is worth continuing.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of 
liability” to designate forms of participation in atrocity such as instigation, 
aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) and command 
responsibility.1 In 2001, Mirjan Damaška authored a sublime critique of 
one of these modes of liability in an article entitled The Shadow Side of 
Command Responsibility.2 Intellectually, the article was somewhat 
daunting for me as a then aspiring academic; it drew on a staggering 
breadth of learning in the history of criminal law, the theory of criminal 
responsibility and comparative law. Substantively, the article also planted 
a seed for my own subsequent work—at one point in this wonderful piece, 
Damaška argued that to the extent command responsibility was not 
objectionable, it merely collapsed into garden-variety omission liability.3 
This argument sparked my own thinking about the extent to which forms 
of liability as a species could be folded into a single unified set of 
normative principles. Why stop at just command responsibly? Several 
years later, this intuition led me to the unitary theory of perpetration that I 
revisit here. Stylistically, Damaška’s exceptionally eloquent prose 
awakened a realization that legal scholarship could be warmly critical, 
involve a spirited commitment to justice, draw heavily on the imagination 
and act as a vehicle for one’s own attempt at aesthetic excellence. I hope 
that my very inferior attempt at emulation here reveals something of his 
influence.     
At present, “modes of liability” are numerous in international 
criminal law (“ICL”), ranging from traditional notions of instigation and 
aiding and abetting to more exotic concepts like Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(“JCE”) as well as the object of Damaška’s original critique, command 
responsibility. To my mind, the difficulties Damaška so eloquently 
pointed to in his earlier work encompass most species in the genus.  
Viewed as an ensemble, modes of liability appear to be sometimes harsh, 
                                                
1 As I have pointed out in earlier work, the phrase “modes of liability” is slightly 
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree. See James G. Stewart, The 
End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 165–219, 
166 (2012). 
2 Mirjan Damas̆ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
455–496 (2001). 
3 Id. at 462. (“When superiors are aware of the impending delinquency of their 
subordinates and do nothing to stop them, their omission shades into conventional 
complicity - aiding by omission - and has therefore hardly any independent purchase.”). 
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occasionally too lenient, frequently very difficult to understand, the source 
of important inefficiency, and as a combined consequence of all the 
foregoing, in a state of seemingly continuous flux. In what follows, I 
reiterate my suggestion that “modes of liability” should be abandoned in 
ICL, arguing again for a single functional unitary theory of perpetration 
wherever international crimes are invoked.4 On this theory, whenever an 
international crime is charged in any forum, national or international, a 
causal contribution combined with the mental element(s) required by the 
crime charged would be necessary and sufficient to establish participation 
in the international crime.5  
As things transpire, my project is not new. In 1902, the world’s 
leading criminal law theorists formally endorsed the unitary theory of 
perpetration at a distinguished congress of the Union International de 
Droit Pénal (“UIDP”) in St Petersburg, precisely because it promised to 
overcome many of the same sorts of problems that modern ICL now 
struggles with.6 The UIDP, or Internationalen kriminalistischen 
Vereinigung (“IKV”) as it was also known, represented the who’s-who of 
world criminal law theorists, at a time when passion for criminal science 
was arguably at its zenith. As a consequence of its then intellectual 
prestige, the UIDP’s endorsement of the unitary theory had a marked 
impact in practice—at least five countries abolished the differentiated 
system previously in force within their jurisdictions in favor of the unitary 
theory on the strength of this intellectual leadership. For reasons I come to 
                                                
4 My previous article, entitled The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes, 
argued that a unitary theory of perpetration follows from the criticisms of individual 
“modes of liability” of international criminal law, accounts for conceptual shortcomings 
of complicity in ICL, is theoretically defensible, and offers a set of pragmatic advantages 
in ICL in particular. See Stewart, supra note 2. I did not commit to a pure, functional, or 
sentence-based variant of the unitary theory in this earlier work. On this distinction, see 
James G. Stewart, Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (Markus Dubber 
& Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014). Upon reflection, I am minded to think that a functional 
unitary theory is preferable to a pure system, since this functional variant announces the 
various forms of causation, like instigating and aiding for example, while still employing 
stable substantive elements for all forms of participation. I am grateful to Kai Ambos for 
suggesting that I clarify this point. 
5 For a conceptual overview of different theories of complicity from a comparative 
perspective, including three variations of the unitary theory, see James G. Stewart, 
Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle 
eds., 2014). 
6 Bulletin de l’Union Internationale de Droit Pénal 137 (1904) (“Quant à la question de 
la complicité, la loi devra abandoner toute distinction doctrinaire entre ceux qui on 
participé au meme crime et se borner à indiquer les modes de participation qu’elle 
considérera comme tells”). Abandoning formal distinctions between participants but still 
announcing forms of participations as a guide to the public makes this theory a functional 
unitary theory. I also think that a functional unitary theory would be preferable in ICL.  
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momentarily, five is a far greater number than it seems at first blush. In 
this article, I argue that ICL should imitate this shift, not just within 
international courts, but also in national systems when international crimes 
are charged.  
Ironically, the UIDP also shared this universalizing ambition—
according to Professor Franz von Liszt, one of the group’s intellectual 
forefathers, the significant advance in criminal science that produced the 
unitary theory of perpetration should feature as a central part of “the 
unification of criminal codes,” and the “universalization of criminal law.”7 
In this Article, I take von Liszt’s project seriously, at least for trials 
involving international crimes. At least one leading modern scholar also 
shares these sentiments. Referring to the “universal structure of criminal 
law” as an “antidote” to the sorts of positivist arguments that reify 
domestic criminal doctrine, George Fletcher writes that “resolutions on the 
surface of the law should not obscure the unity that underlies apparently 
diverse legal cultures.”8 Consequently, “the task of theorists in the current 
century is to elaborate the general principles of criminal law that should be 
recognized not only in the International Criminal Court, but in all civilized 
nations.”9 
Instead of revisiting my earlier work defending the unitary theory in 
abstract terms,10 this article interrogates why the UIDP then various 
national legal systems abandoned differentiated forms of blame attribution 
in favor of the unitary theory. As things transpire, the problems that led 
these national systems to a volte-face on the topic of blame attribution are 
strikingly similar to those the ICL is currently wrestling with. 
Consequently, the histories that follow should act as a caution against a 
faith that judge-made law will ultimately produce a settled defensible 
consensus about forms of attribution in ICL or, in other words, that a 
dogmatik will eventually emerge with time. In a number of the national 
systems I discuss below this never came to pass, to the point that leading 
criminal law theorists of the day ultimately advocated for transcending the 
                                                
7 LEON RADZINOWICZ, THE ROOTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL 
LAW AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE: A TRIBUTE AND A RE-ASSESSMENT ON THE CENTENARY 
OF THE IKV 24 (1991). 
8 GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998). 
9 GEORGE FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2007). 
10 For a discussion linked to international criminal law particular, see Stewart, supra note 
2. More generally, see THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT 
TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN 
BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-FUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (1. 
Auflage. ed. 2009); Johannes Keiler, Towards a European Concept of Participation in 
Crime, in SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 157 – 317 (André 
Klip ed., 2011). 
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very structure that subsumed the doctrine. I again suggest that ICL should 
consider following this alternative route. 
I divide the article into five separate parts, each of which singles out 
a particular rationale for each of the five different states cited for departing 
from the differentiated system of blame attribution in favor of a unitary 
alternative. The historical narrative proceeds in chronological order, 
starting with the initial promulgation of a unitary theory of perpetration in 
Norway and culminating with the Austrian law adopted most recently. 
Although I have isolated one rationale for the unitary theory per country, I 
do not mean to imply that these were the only motivations for the 
normative shift in each context; there were actually a large number of 
reasons for abandoning the differentiated system of blame attribution in 
each jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by highlighting five states’ rationales for 
the juridical change and mapping these rationales onto protracted debates 
about blame attribution in modern ICL, I hope to shed new light on the 
ways in which contemporary struggles on the topic at the international 
level are contingent on the differentiated structure. In each of the national 
systems I review, scholars were grappling with the very same problems 
that haunt modern ICL now, before they reached for a transcendent 
solution. 
Several disclaimers are necessary at the outset. In what follows, I 
traverse an unreasonably wide terrain. I have not visited any archive in 
compiling these histories and my materials are, for the most part, from 
secondary sources. I have also had to engage the research assistance of 
native language speakers in each of the countries I write about, so the 
likelihood that I have misunderstood or distorted original theorists in 
certain instances is unavoidably high. In addition, I have not highlighted 
differences between pure, functional and sentence-based unitary systems 
in the various jurisdictions I discuss,11 thereby failing to illuminate the 
sometimes marked discrepancies between them.12 Similarly, my project is 
                                                
11 I have explained the differences between these three variants of the unitary theory 
elsewhere, questioning whether the sentence-based account is properly classified as 
unitary at all. For an overview, see Stewart, supra note 5, at 539-540. 
12 Art. 12, Austrian Criminal Code adopts a functional unitary theory by announcing 
different forms of participation like perpetrators, instigators and accomplices, but it 
maintains uniform substantive elements for these various forms, thus justifying its 
inclusion within the unitary theory family. See JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 
194 (2e ed. 2002). Norway, on the other hand, has no provision governing substantive 
rules of participation at all, relegating these issues to the special part of the criminal code. 
For discussion, see JOHANNES ANDENAES, THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF NORWAY 274-277 (1965). Coincidently, this approach accords with Douglas Husak’s 
conceptual preference for complicity. Douglas Husak, Abetting a Crime, 33 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 41–73 (2014). In Denmark, to offer one final variation, it appears that 
causation is not required for any form of participation. See Jørn Vestergaard, Criminal 
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entirely historical, which overlooks contemporary perceptions of the 
unitary theory of perpetration’s function in these various systems. Several 
friends, for instance, have pointed out that in at least one of my examples, 
the enthusiasm for the unitary theory at the point of codification many 
decades ago is almost certainly a thing of the past. Because my project is 
mostly historical, I must defer to others on these questions.13  Finally, I 
have not engaged with the thoughtful criticisms of the unitary theory of 
perpetration that are beginning to emerge in ICL,14 hoping that my 
opinionated argument below will make a further contribution to a lively 
but respectful scholarly debate to be staged elsewhere. In this vein, I very 
much hope that what follows instigates a range of in-country experts to 
correct, critique and elaborate upon my brief accounts. 
 
 
II. INTELLECTUAL DISSATISFACTION IN NORWAY 
 
In 1828, the German Professor of criminal law, Christoph Karl 
Stübel, wrote a highly influential book on criminal legislation.15 In it, he 
explored the implications of then new thinking about causation for the 
concept of complicity. According to the then newly popular theory of 
counterfactual dependence (known as Äquivalenztheorie in the native 
German), all conditions are considered causal that could not be left out of 
                                                                                                                     
Participation in Danish Law - Uniformity Unlimited? in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY IN 
TRANSITION: FINISH AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 475–490 (Raimo Lahti & Kimmo 
Nuotio eds., 1992). Here again, Anglo-American theorists would concur. Alexander, 
Morse and Ferzan offer a conceptual defense of a normative scheme precisely like the 
Danish--one that does not formally distinguish between various forms of participation 
and removes causation for all aspects of the criminal law. See LARRY ALEXANDER, 
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009). 
13 For an extensive review of this sort, see BETTINA WEIßER, TÄTERSCHAFT IN EUROPA: 
EIN DISKUSSIONSVORSCHLAG FÜR EIN EUROPÄISCHES TÄTERMODELL AUF DER BASIS 
EINER RECHTSVERGLEICHENDEN UNTERSUCHUNG DER BETEILIGUNGSSYSTEME 
DEUTSCHLANDS, ENGLANDS, FRANKREICHS, ITALIENS UND ÖSTERREICHS (1. Auflage. ed. 
2011). 
14 Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt, Establishing Degrees of Responsibility: Modes of 
Participation in Article 25 of the ICC Statute, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Elies van Sliedregt and Boris Burghart eds.), pp. 301-319 (criticizing 
my defense of the unitary theory of perpetration). See also, CASSANDRA STEER, 
TRANSLATING GUILT: IDENTIFYING LEADERSHIP LIABILITY FOR MASS ATROCITY (T.M.C 
Asser Press, 2015) (same). 
15 CHRISTOPH CARL STÜBEL, UEBER DIE THEILNAHME MEHRERER PERSONEN AN EINEM 
VERBRECHEN: EIN BEITRAG ZUR CRIMINALGESETZGEBUNG UND ZUR BERICHTIGUNG DER 
IN DEN CRIMINALGERICHTEN GELTENDEN GRUNDSÄTZE (1828). 
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consideration without the result not occurring.16 By implication, all 
conditions are conceptually equivalent not temporally sequenced, meaning 
that both the person who supplies the weapon and the murderer who uses 
it make equal causal contributions to a consummated crime according to 
the prevailing test, regardless of their contribution’s temporal distance 
from it. Stübel was not the first to contemplate the equivalence of causal 
contributions but he was original in one respect—he doubted whether 
formal causal equality necessarily resulted in the same sentence for 
perpetrators and accomplices.17 Thus, the journey to the unitary theory 
began. If causation unified perpetrators and accomplices alike at the level 
of attribution, any need for differentiated sentencing could be achieved 
after responsibility for the consummated crime was attributed.    
After Stübel, a number of other prominent European theorists 
developed and refined the potentiality of a unitary theory,18 but it is highly 
unlikely that their intellectual labors would have born fruit in practice 
without the catalytic effect of the UIDP. Founded in 1888 by three 
prominent European criminal law theorists,19 the UIDP or IKV as it also 
described itself in its second working language, brought together the 
leading scholars of the time. The professional association soon became 
exceptionally popular internationally—by 1905 it boasted a membership 
of one thousand two hundred participants from thirty countries.20 
Although the organization served as a platform for discussions about a 
range of topics, complicity was high on the group’s agenda for a number 
of years:  its members were preoccupied with “[t]he influence of the new 
concepts in the field of criminal law on ways of defining…complicity.”21  
Ultimately, this interest led them to abandon the doctrine as an 
autonomous concept in line with the insights developed by Stübel and his 
many successors. As I have argued elsewhere, I am of the opinion that 
ICL should do similarly. 
                                                
16 For discussion of Äquivalenztheorie, see Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 4. 
Aufl. (München: Beck, 2006), vol. 1, p. 352, § 11 Rn 7. For English-language 
equivalents, see VOLKER KREY, GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART 47–57 (2002) 
(providing a helpful English language overview of causation in German criminal theory); 
H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 431–464 (discussing dominant 
German theories of causation) (2 ed. 1985). 
17 ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 35. 
18 Id. at 34–76. (discussing twenty-six other authors in the Germanophone tradition who 
addressed the unitary theory of perpetration. This, of course, does not summarize the 
contributions of others in various jurisdictions, especially Scandanavia and Austria). 
19 The three included Franz von Liszt, its founder, Adolphe Prins and Gerard Anton van 
Hamel. 
20 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 6, at 2. 
21 Id. at 11. 
2016]  9 
   
Norway was the first to abandon a differentiated system of 
attribution like that presently applicable in ICL in favor of the unitary 
theory of perpetration. The Norwegians made this shift, in part, because 
their leading academic minds viewed the unitary theory of perpetration as 
conceptually superior. In 1875, for instance, the Norwegian Professor 
Bernhard Getz published his thesis “Report on the So-Called Complicity 
in Crimes,” in which he dismissed as invalid all distinctions between 
parties to crimes, arguing that they should be subsumed within a more 
extensive singular notion of perpetration.22 The core of his thesis, which 
should have strong resonance for all familiar with the contemporary 
connundra with forms of participation in modern ICL, was that “I am 
aware of the line that legislation and theory draws between the perpetrator 
on one side, and the accomplice on the other, but the line between the two 
lacks a solid foundation.”23 In particular, Getz observed that: 
 
“I don’t know how a perpetrator is unlike an accomplice and 
hence I have entitled this paper ‘The So-Called Participation 
in Crime.’ It seems to me that the accomplice fulfills all the 
necessary requirements to be perceived as a perpetrator and 
that every perception of the concept perpetration that 
excludes the accomplice leads to unreasonable results, which 
no one is willing to clarify.”24 
 
Repeatedly referring to the concept of complicity in differentiated systems 
as “amputated” from the body of blame attribution, Getz argued that the 
sorts of debates about the separation of perpetration from complicity that 
now captivate modern ICL arise from the fact that “this concept has been 
torn out from its natural context.”25 Reintegration, therefore, was a more 
conceptually attractive means of overcoming what was ultimately for 
Getz, a false dilemma. 
 Getz raised a number of arguments to substantiate both his 
intellectual dissatisfaction with the differentiated system and the 
transcendent solution he preferred. With respect to the accomplice’s 
objective contribution, he argued, drawing on the then groundbreaking 
view of the equivalence of causes, that “[e]very action is objectively 
speaking in the same relationship with the crime, every action leads to the 
                                                
22 BERNHARD GETZ, OM DEN SAAKALDTE DELAGTIGHET I FORBRYDELSER: EN 
STRAFFERETLIG UNDERSØKELSE 2 (Christiana, 1875). My kind thanks to Jon Erik 
Lundgaard for his assistance with translations from the original Norwegian. 
23 Id., at 2 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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crime.”26 Consequently, “[o]ne must ask: Has the person contributed to 
the crime or not? If he has, he is a perpetrator and consequently equally to 
blame.” 27 In the subjective realm, Getz was earnest to point out how 
motives are normally irrelevant to criminal liability, so appending 
additional subjective elements in an attempt to differentiate perpetrators 
from accomplices (i.e. did the actor view the crime as her own) was not 
only a departure from normal thinking, it amounted to “an unconditional 
mistake.”28 Concluding his study colorfully, Getz reaffirmed that “every 
proposition to prove the specific distinction between the accomplice and 
the perpetrator has flashed before our eyes and must be deemed 
inadequate.”29  
ICL’s plight to solve the riddle Getz found to be without convincing 
solution has played out in various different ways. Initially, the ICC 
seemed to treat the plurality of “modes of liability” in the ICC Statute as 
axiomatic—as if it is made necessary by the very metaphysics of blame 
attribution. For instance, the ICC’s first decision incorporating the 
German notion of “control over the crime” as a criterion for delimiting 
perpetration from complicity simply states that “the definitional criterion 
of the concept of co-perpetration is linked to the distinguishing criterion 
between principals and accessories to a crime where a criminal offence is 
committed by a plurality of persons.”30 The Chamber did not indicate how 
the Statute made the distinguishing criterion conceptually inevitable. In 
fact, the use of the definite article to imply an inexorable division between 
perpetration and complicity is at odds with the scholarly work of Bernhard 
Getz and others, who had argued that this type of assumption was 
conceptually invalid.31 Moreover, to assume the contrary is not only 
insensitive to the theory Getz helped popularize, it is also slightly out of 
step with the history of ICL.  
Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters explicitly enumerated 
different forms of attribution,32 the Nuremberg Tribunal itself merely 
                                                
26 Id., at 4. 
27 Id. 
28 Id., at 52. 
29 Id., at 59. 
30 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 326 (June 15, 2009) (emphasis added). 
31 ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 17. 
32 Art. 6(3) of the Nuremberg Charter reads: “Leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan.” Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (Supp. 1945). 
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considered whether an accused was “concerned in,” “connected with”, 
“inculpated in” or “implicated in” international crimes.33 As many leading 
commentators now accept, this approach entailed a unitary theory of 
perpetration that was functionally equivalent to the concept the UIDP and 
Getz had called for,34 namely, a system of blame attribution that declined 
to disaggregate modes of participation into formal legal concepts like 
aiding and abetting, superior responsibility or JCE, instead holding the 
substantive elements of blame attribution constant across the various roles 
different actors might play. Thus, the Nuremberg Tribunal dispensed with 
“the distinguishing criterion” a majority at the ICC would later assume to 
be structurally inescapable. Although the judges at Nuremberg made no 
explicit reference to Getz or the unitary theory, their approach does point 
to a similar intellectual dissatisfaction at some of the earliest stages of 
modern ICL. 
The same intellectual dissatisfaction is evident today, albeit among a 
minority of prominent international judges. Like other aspects of ICL, the 
differentiated system of blame attribution and the difficult normative 
dilemmas that accompany it are “haunted by the presence of dissenting 
counter-narratives.”35 ICC Judge van den Wyngaert, for instance, has 
argued that “[v]ery often the acts and conduct of political and military 
leaders will simply not fit the mould of principal liability. To try to 
characterise them as principals at any cost will thus often be problematic 
from a legal and conceptual point of view. However, once the rigid 
division between [perpetration and complicity] is abandoned, there is no 
                                                
33 For an overview of these cases, see THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 
VOL. XV, 49–58 (1947). 
34 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 
AND GENERAL PART 105 (2013) (“the IMT and IMTFE Statutes merely require a causal 
contribution to a certain criminal result, thereby opting for a unitarian concept of 
perpetration (Einheitstäterschaft). As will be seen below, the jurisprudence adopted this 
fairly unsophisticated approach.”); OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
21 (2010) (“the IMT and IMTFE embraced a unitary model which did not distinguish 
between the perpetration of a crime... and participation in a crime committed by a third 
person”); and ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 781 (2002) (“for 
supranational courts and codes, this somehow `holistic’ model of perpetratorship [the 
unitary theory of perpetration] seemed attractive enough to be followed by the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals”). 
35 GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME : WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (2007). Simpson eloquently points out the “discordant notes” 
dissenting judges have often sounded in the history of ICL. To use his metaphor, these 
dissents on forms of attribution are discordant with respect to the majority of academic 
opinion on the topic by they turn out to be harmonic with Bernhard Getz’s unitary theory 
of perpetration. 
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reason to qualify them as principals in order to attribute the level of blame 
which they deserve.”36 Similarly, ICC Judge Fulford has argued against 
“the perceived necessity to establish a clear dividing line between the 
various forms of liability… to distinguish between the liability of 
‘accessories’… and that of ‘principals.’”37 Admittedly, Getz took these 
sorts of ideas a step further by advocating for substantive consistency in 
standards of attribution, to the point that the importance of differentiating 
between them disintegrated. Still, the harmony between aspects of his 
theory and these dissenting opinions is an important part of what makes 
the history of the unitary theory so eerie now. 
The familiarly of the unitary theory’s history for modern ICL also 
plays out in theory, where recent scholarship by leading theorists proves 
that intellectual history can also repeat. In a recent set of articles, for 
instance, one of the leading contemporary theorists of criminal law in the 
English-speaking world, Michael Moore, has surmised that complicity is 
conceptually “superfluous.”38 He argues that “there is no unique desert 
basis for accomplice liability. Aiding another to cause some bad result is 
not an independent desert basis. It is a mere stand-in for one of the four 
general bases on which we are rightly blamed.”39 Like the judges at 
Nuremberg and the ICC, this argumentation does not draw on the UIDP, 
Getz or the unitary tradition they helped initiate, but the underlying 
intellectual dissatisfaction with the autonomous concept of complicity 
mirrors Getz’s discontent a century prior, in ways that create a strange 
sense of déjà vu. Some of Moore’s language is even reminiscent of 
Getz—in concluding his brilliant study of the same topic more than a 
hundred years later, Moore opined that “[w]hat we have seen should be 
sufficient to sink the good ship Complicity, not rearrange its 
furnishings.”40   
In Norway, this sinking came about at the behest of Getz himself 
together with the scholarly imprimatur of the UIDP. Professor Getz was a 
prominent member of the association, which helped the dissemination of 
                                                
36 See Ngudjolo Trial Judgement, Case no.: ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, (Dec. 18, 2012)  ¶ 29. 
37 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 Judgement pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute, (Mar. 14, 2012), Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, 
¶ 6. 
38 Michael S Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 395 (2007); See also Michael S. Moore, The Superfluity of Accomplice 
Liability, in CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND 
METAPHYSICS 280–323 (2009); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009). 
39 Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, supra n 38, at 395. 
40 Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, supra note 36, at 
449. 
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this thesis. His work quickly caught the attention of prominent criminal 
theorists, in an age when the law professor was the “hero figure” of legal 
globalization.41 Unsurprisingly, this influence increased by some order of 
magnitude after he was asked to draft the Norwegian criminal code. 
According to one modern Norwegian scholar, Getz’s Code “won 
international recognition and, in its time, was considered the most modern 
penal code in Europe.”42 Of course, its treatment of complicity surprised 
no one—the Norwegian Code of 1902 contained a pure unitary theory of 
perpetration, which remains in force to this day.43 So in sharp 
contradistinction to the origins of global criminal doctrine I address in the 
context of Brazil below, the unitary theory was developed initially from 
conceptual first principles that still resonate with ICL judges and theorists 
today, then it was adopted by a selection of national legal systems like 
Norway with some important degree of “indigeneity.”44 Certainly, there is 
still a great deal to be said for and against the unitary theory in ICL, but it 
is noteworthy how intellectual dissatisfaction was a key motivating factor 
in Norway’s turn away from a differentiated system, and how that 
dissatisfaction lives on in ICL today. 
  
 
III. UNDUE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN DENMARK 
 
As was the case in Norway before its shift to a unitary system (and 
in ICL presently), the Danish Criminal Code of 1866 embraced a 
differentiated system of criminal responsibility. But following in 
Norway’s steed, Denmark parted ways with the differentiated model once 
presented with the perceived advance in criminal science the unitary 
theory entailed. To this day, “[i]n Danish literature on criminal law, the 
[unitary theory of perpetration] is considered to be by far superior to other 
legal models.”45 In the Danish history, a leading Professor of Criminal 
Law named Carl Torp emerged as the chief protagonist for this doctrinal 
                                                
41 Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 638 (2002) (“The hero figure of the first globalization was the 
law professor (author of codes and statutory modifications of codes, as well as of 
treaties)”). 
42 ANDENAES, supra note 11, at 20. 
43 Id. at 277. (“Whether the defendant is guilty as a principal or a cooperator is merely a 
factor to be considered in meting out punishment, and there is no judicial interest in 
drawing a sharp line between the two.”). 
44 I borrow the term from Schauer, who points to a frequent desire for reactionary law 
reform after periods of foreign dominance to create a “transformed republic... whose 
chief characteristic is its ‘indigeneity.’” FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE POLITICS AND 
INCENTIVES OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION (2000). 
45 Vestergaard, supra note 11, at 489. 
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realignment, although by that time, the impetus of the UIDP’s 
endorsement in 1902 and the Norwegian example led by Getz 
undoubtedly reduced the intellectual leadership required of him. While 
Torp rehearsed a familiar set of conceptual arguments against the 
differentiated system in advocating for its dismantling in Denmark,46 he 
also seized upon a range of practical observations about difficulties with 
its operation. In one instance, for example, he argued: 
 
“Presumably it is now recognized from all sides, that the 
current Criminal Code in relation to an accessory in a crime 
sets out a series of rather artificial and mutual artificial 
delimiting Concepts that only moderately correspond to life’s 
natural Conditions and cause unnecessary difficulties in 
applying the law.”47  
  
Based on some years experience at the coalface, I am of the opinion that a 
wide variety of “modes of liability” in ICL have also become artificial, 
only moderately correspond to real life, and are unnecessary difficult to 
apply. To illustrate, I here focus on just one mode of liability, indirect co-
perpetration, which appears to exemplify all three of the shortcomings 
Torp observed of the differentiated model operative in Denmark at the 
time.  
 Indirect co-perpetration has emerged as the next major trend in 
ICL’s experimentation with standards of blame attribution.48 The concept 
                                                
46 CARL TORP, DEN DANSKE STRAFFERETS ALMINDELIGE DEL (1905) (“Presumably the 
participant’s Act may be just as necessary a preliminary Condition as the perpetrator’s 
crime offence … It all must come to the recognition that every preliminary Condition in 
relation to a specific Circumstance is equally necessary and therefore in theory of equal 
Importance, so that it is impossible to single out one or more Conditions as relevant in 
contrast to the remaining Conditions.”) I am grateful to Anja Amdi Harild for the 
translation. 
47 Betænkning afgiven af Straffelovskommissionen af 9. November 1917 (“Report from 
the Penal Code Commission of November 9, 1917”) In the explanatory notes to the draft 
Offence Code, the Commission states “it cannot be recognized that there is a sharp 
essential difference between Perpetrators and Accessories”. See Danish Criminal Code 
Report of 1923, Explanatory Statements to the Draft Criminal Code, column 73. 
48 Strikingly, indirect co-perpetration is charged in most cases before the ICC presently, 
confirming that it represents the next trend in international blame attributions. The 
following is a non-exhaustive sample of cases involving indirect co-perpetration at the 
ICC. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No.: ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Warrant of Arrest, (Jun. 10, 
2008), ¶ 21; Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 30 September 2008, ¶ 492 [hereafter “Katanga Confirmation 
Decision”]; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 
2009, at 7; Prosecutor v. Kenyatta et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Case 
No.: ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, (Jan. 23, 2012), ¶ 300 [hereafter “Kenyatta 
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is an amalgam of two distinct “modes of liability.” The co-perpetration 
element, initially rejected at ad hoc tribunals, was recently included within 
the ICC Statute as a species of perpetration. The second component, 
indirect perpetration, is analogous to the Anglo-American concept of 
innocent agency, whereby an individual becomes responsible for a 
criminal offense by employing an innocent actor (such as a child) as an 
instrument through which he brings about the crime. By fudging the fact 
that African foot soldiers are not actually innocent agents, then marrying 
this slightly fictitious rendering of indirect perpetration to co-perpetration, 
the ICC has adopted a notion of “diagonal responsibility” to hold one 
African warlord responsible as a perpetrator for the crimes committed by 
rank and file soldiers in a separate armed group the warlord co-operated 
with. In my opinion, this approach dovetails with all of Torp’s practical 
criticisms of the differentiated system that was once in place within 
Denmark.  
 First, indirect co-perpetration is highly artificial. For some of the 
modern advocates of the unitary theory of participation, the very moment 
differentialists dilute indirect perpetration (a.k.a “innocent” agency) to the 
point where the actual foot-soldier doing the bloodletting need no longer 
be innocent, they do irreparable harm to their entire analytical scheme. As 
Thomas Rotsch has argued, once there is a fully responsible principal 
perpetrator (i.e. a foot-soldier who enjoys full moral capacity), there 
should be no leeway for applying the doctrine of indirect perpetratorship 
to the soldier’s superior if differentiation is to be taken seriously.49 The 
very idea of a “perpetrator behind a perpetrator” demonstrates inductive 
reasoning in defiance of the rationale for ex ante differentiation in the first 
place. Once this idea is entertained, intuitions about culpability and 
sentencing are generating exceptional concepts that run counter to 
                                                                                                                     
Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v Ruto et al, Case No.: ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 
(Jan. 23, 2012), ¶¶ 290-292 [hereafter “Ruto Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v 
Bosco Ntaganda, Case No.: ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, (Jun. 
8, 2014), ¶ 97 [hereafter “Ntaganda Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v Laurent 
Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, Case 
No.:ICC-02/11-01/11, (Jun. 12, 2014), ¶ 226 [hereafter “Laurent Gbagbo Confirmation 
Decision”] Part of my enthusiasm for the unitary theory of perpetration derives from my 
skepticism about the way in which modes of attribution seem to move in fads 
internationally, from superior responsibility, to JCE, and now to indirect co-perpetration 
and its various component parts. It is peculiar that blame attribution moves in fads 
internationally. 
49 ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 461–462. 
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foundational assumptions about differentiation.50 If differentiation has to 
rely on a fiction to prop itself up, perhaps the concept should fall? 
 Second, indirect co-perpetration also vindicates Torp’s concern that 
differentiated systems like that operative in modern ICL “only moderately 
correspond to real life.” As I have pointed out elsewhere,51 the risk in 
making a concept as complex as indirect co-perpetration a mainstay of 
blame attribution in ICL is that the meaning of increasingly abstract legal 
terms seems esoteric to defendants, victims and ordinary citizens, who no 
longer understand the terminology or its moral import.52 To illustrate, 
when the ICC indicted former President Laurent Gbagbo as an indirect co-
perpetrator, the BBC placed the mode of participation in parentheses to 
mark the technocratic legalese it had no expectation its readers would 
understand.53 Contrariwise, if Gbagbo is responsible for the international 
crimes he is reproached for, it seems infinitely more likely that his making 
a substantial causal contribution to the crimes together with the necessary 
blameworthy moral choice will better “correspond to real life,” in ways 
that Torp foresaw. Moreover, discarding the label “indirect co-
perpetration” could minimize the distancing effect of culturally-specific 
legal terminology. 
 Third, Torp’s misgiving that differentiated systems “cause 
unnecessary difficulties in applying the law” also seems apparent from the 
short history of indirect co-perpetration in ICL. In the interests of brevity, 
I here summarize a set of milestones in that history that, in my opinion, 
reveal precisely the type of over-complication I imagine Torp had in mind. 
The ICC has insisted that the combination of co-perpetration and indirect 
perpetration “allows the Court to assess the blameworthiness of ‘senior 
leaders’ adequately.”54 However, at least one judge has objected that by 
                                                
50 Id. at 461–462. Rotsch’s broader point is that as a result of these dynamics, different 
forms of participation do not adequately mirror distinct degrees of culpability, traditional 
doctrines on modes of participation are manipulated in order to achieve fair outcomes, 
and ultimately, distinguishing between different modes of participation is already 
unnecessary. 
51 Stewart, supra note 2, at 212. 
52 Id. at 212. 
53 John James, Ivory Coast: Gbagbo faces murder and rape charges, 30 November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15960254 (“Former Ivory Coast President 
Laurent Gbagbo is facing four charges of crimes against humanity, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has said. He is accused of being an ‘indirect co-perpetrator’ of 
murder, rape, persecution and other inhuman acts.”) 
54 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga et al, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Case 
No.: ICC-01/04-01/07-717, (Sept. 30, 2008), ¶ 492. 
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this method, the Court has invented a “totally new mode of liability.”55 
The unitary theory of perpetration that so inspired Torp and his diverse 
contemporaries within the UIDP would not allow for even the suggestion 
of totally new modes of liability like this since the unitary theory is, by 
definition, singular. Similarly, the ICC has adopted Claus Roxin’s theory 
of organizational perpetration as a part of the co-perpetration component 
of indirect co-perpetration,56 even though one leading German theorist 
feared that this “may create more problems than it solves.”57 Then, after 
the initial appearance of indirect co-perpetration at the ICC, subsequent 
Chambers added another complicated mental element,58 before having to 
determine whether dolus eventualis was a sufficient basis for establishing 
indirect co-perpetration.59 Presently, depending on which interpretation 
one follows, the test for indirect co-perpetration involves five objective 
elements and four subjective, all of which are linguistically complex.60 
                                                
55 Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment Pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 
Case No.: ICC-01/04-02/12, (Dec 18, 2012), Concurring Opinion of Judge Van den 
Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, ¶ ¶ 60-61. 
56 See Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 498; Ruto Confirmation 
Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 313; Ntaganda Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 104. 
Laurent Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 234.  
57 Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of 
a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 105 (2011) (“Since criminal liability 
for ordering or instigation is a sufficient basis for imposing severe sentences on 
responsible figures in the background of the actual crimes, adopting the notion of 
‘perpetration through an organization’ may create more problems than it solves.”). I am 
inclined to extend this reasoning to all modes of liability, but even if there is a principled 
basis for denying the criticism that reach, it is still telling that a figure of Weigend’s 
authority would question the merit of employing a German concept whose use is so 
widespread at the ICC now. 
58 Although the Lubanga Confirmation of Charges Decision had not required this 
element, the Katanga Confirmation of Charges Decision added that “the suspects must be 
aware of the character of their organisations, their authority within the organisation and 
the factual circumstances enabling near-automatic compliance with their orders.” 
Compare Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan. 29, 2007), ¶ 326 [hereafter “Lubanga 
Confirmation Decision”] with Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 534. 
59 In the Katanga and Kenyatta Confirmation Decisions, Pre-Trial Chambers I and II 
made no mention of whether dolus eventualis would suffice for indirect co-perpetration. 
Subsequently, Pre-Trial Chamber III explicitly excluded it in the Bemba and Ruto 
Confirmation Decisions. Compare Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 531 
and Kenyatta Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 410 with Ruto Confirmation of 
Charges Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 333-336 
60 For an excellent summary of this and other ICC case law on forms of participation, see 
WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, MODES OF LIABILITY: A REVIEW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE AND PRACTICE 60–61 
(2013), http://iccwomen.org/documents/Modes-of-Liability.pdf (setting out the elements 
of indirect-perpetration across two pages). 
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Most significantly, I suspect that Torp would find all these difficulties to 
be of no conceptual importance,61 and therefore categorize them as 
“unnecessary.”  
 There is much for ICL to learn from this very brief history. After 
almost two decades of negotiations Torp led in Denmark, the Danish 
parliament adopted a unitary theory of perpetration. Like Getz, Torp was 
also the author of the criminal code that contained the system of blame 
attribution he saw as preferable in a national context that did not have to 
synthesize multiple legal traditions from throughout the world. So by a 
process that was not entirely original but still infinitely freer than that 
which brought about differentiated systems of blame attribution in most 
systems of criminal justice (see Brazil below), the Danish adopted a 
unitary theory of perpetration with the backing of global criminal law 
theorists and the good example of a Nordic cousin. Moreover, despite the 
power and influence of the largest European states that adopt a different 
system, and the rise of international criminal justice that defers to these 
powerful systems, Denmark has stuck with a unitary theory of 
perpetration to this day.62 Strikingly, the practical reasons for its shift to 
the unitary theory are now mirrored internationally, except that the need 
for coherence is far greater for a global brand of criminal attribution.  
 
 
IV. A MULTIPLICITY OF COMPETING SOLUTIONS IN ITALY 
 
 Italy adopted a variant of the unitary theory of perpetration in 1930, 
in a process that again saw the UIDP and leading local scholars (as 
distinct from colonializing masters, market pressures or reactionary 
assertions of autonomy) play a leading role. In 1889, the Criminal Code of 
the Kingdom of Italy, known as the Zanardelli Code after its author, 
formally propagated a differentiated model of attribution replete with the 
usual catalogue of “modes of liability.” In 1919, however, an influential 
member of the Italian positivist school of criminology named Enrico Ferri 
was chosen as President of the Criminal Reform Commission, which 
                                                
61 In this respect, while I view Shachar Eldar’s excellent article on indirect co-
perpetration as the most sophisticated conceptual account of the topic I have read, the 
very thoughtful piece does not articulate why a substantial causal contribution plus the 
mental element of the crime charged should not suffice for indirect perpetration, in which 
case we could dispense with this complicated architecture. Conversely, if these two 
elements are not sufficient, the question may become whether indirect co-perpetration is 
in danger of illiberal excess. See Shachar Eldar, Indirect Co-Perpetration, 8 CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 605–617 (2014). 
62 Vestergaard, supra note 12 (discussing the parameters and merits of the unitary theory 
in modern Danish law). 
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began a process of rationalizing these forms of participation. It was not 
until the then Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco, tabled his “Report on the 
Final Draft of the 1930 Code,”63 however, that this process of 
rationalization reached its apogee—Italians abandoned modes of 
participation in favor of a unitary theory of perpetration like that endorsed 
by the UIDP. Once again, aspects of this history reveal points of strange 
commonality with modern ICL. 
 Besides the conceptual motivations others had voiced, the Italians 
also saw real practical advantages in this new rationalization of diverse 
standards of blame attribution, reasoning that a unitary theory would 
provide a definitive solution to the multiplicity of competing theories 
about the distinction between perpetration and complicity, which never 
congealed into a stable shared understanding. In this respect, the important 
point, which dovetails with the experience of international courts and 
tribunals since their modern revival, is that the shift to a unitary theory 
became important in Italy when attempts at distinguishing perpetrators 
from accomplices created enormous legal uncertainty. Numerous creative 
solutions proliferated without ever proving terribly convincing.64 As 
Sergio Seminara shows, at the time the old Zanardelli Code was in force 
in Italy, there were a wide range of doctrine on offer claiming to separate 
perpetrators from accessories, but none were able to point to convincing 
criteria, such that the problem remained without stable solution from start 
to finish.65 In the words of Alfredo Rocco himself, “it is precisely for 
practical needs that doctrine and law have struggled to find a secure 
criteria to distinguish, in case of participation in a crime, principals from 
accessories.”66  
This history is somewhat sobering. If international criminal lawyers 
assume that a consistent international dogmatik will inevitably emerge 
from the ashes of numerous failed experiments, in some instances, history 
suggests otherwise. 
 Already, attempts to differentiate perpetration from complicity in 
ICL are displaying many of the qualities that led Italians to walk away 
from the entire project. The Italian concern that no satisfying point of 
differentiation ever emerged in Italy despite no shortage of competing 
                                                
63 Alfredo Rocco, Progetto definitivo di un nuovo codice penale con la relazione del 
Guardasigilli On. Parte I. Relazione sul Libro I del Progetto, LAVORI PREPARATORI DEL 
CODICE PENALE E DEL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE, Vol. V, 165 (1929). 
64 SERGIO SEMINARA, TECHNICHE NORMATIVE E CONCORSO DI PERSONE NEL REATO 31–
42 (1987) (listing a number of doctrines which, at the time the old Zanadelli Code was in 
force, were not able to point out straight criteria for distinguishing between principals 
and accessories.). 
65 Id. at 31–42. 
66 Rocco, supra note 63, at 166.  
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theories has proved prescient for ICL now. Famously, the ICC’s adoption 
of “control over the crime” to do this work met with powerful dissenting 
opinions by two prominent judges, both of whom disputed the need for the 
test at all.67 Likewise, in the academy, the very best scholars have disputed 
objective, subjective and mixed theories of differentiation with great 
insight and rigor but without discernible agreement between them,68 in 
ways their Italian predecessors experienced and would probably have 
anticipated in ICL anew. In fact, some of the very best scholars have 
ultimately concluded that “it is highly questionable whether [the ICC rules 
governing blame attribution are] based on a single coherent, normative 
theory of participation.”69 The Italians, on the other hand, did embrace a 
single coherent, normative theory that stands to transcend the difficulties 
ICL is (also) now negotiating. Again, the similarities with ICL’s present 
are eerie. 
 Instead of retracing the various theories proffered to differentiate 
perpetration from complicity, I pause to offer a qualified defense of the 
Rocco Code in which the Italian rendition of the unitary theory first 
appeared. Some will object that this code is an example of illiberal 
criminal law in the service of totalitarianism. Rocco was a self-proclaimed 
fascist, who unashamedly described the legislation he crafted for 
Mussolini’s autocratic regime as “a political code.”70 Consequently, much 
of the comparative literature still describes the Rocco Code as “the Fascist 
Code.”71 As a result of this unholy historical association, the unitary 
theory of perpetration is often unfairly dismissed out of hand—one 
                                                
67 See statements by ICC Judges Van den Wyngaert and Fulford supra notes 36 and 37. 
68 For a set of excellent but contrasting perspectives on the dividing line between 
perpetration and complicity, see Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in 
International Criminal Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159–200 (2011); Jens David Ohlin, Elies 
Van Sliedregt & Thomas Weigend, Assessing the Control-Theory, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
725–746 (2013); Jens David Ohlin, Searching for the Hinterman In Praise of Subjective 
Theories of Imputation, 12 J INT CRIMINAL JUSTICE 325–343 (2014); Carl-Friedrich 
Stuckenberg, Problems of “Subjective Imputation” in Domestic and International 
Criminal Law, 12 J INT CRIMINAL JUSTICE 311–323 (2014); Alicia Gil Gil & Elena 
Maculan, Current Trends in the Definition of “Perpetrator” by the International 
Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case 
to the Katanga judgment, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 349–371 (2015); Thomas Weigend, 
Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal 
Concept, 9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91 –111 (2011); KAI AMBOS, 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL 
PART 102–180 (2013). 
69 Ohlin, Van Sliedregt, and Weigend, supra note 68, at 744. 
70 MARC ANCEL, SOCIAL DEFENCE: A MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROBLEMS 65 
(1966). 
71 RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 64 (2005); ANCEL, supra 
note 67, at 65. 
2016]  21 
   
Argentine theorist argues that “due to the connection between the unitary 
theory and these ideas [Fascism and Nazism] today nobody argues 
them.”72 That reasoning, however, is likely a non sequitur, deploying a 
kind of guilt by association to discredit a concept that does not deserve the 
reputational sleight.  
In truth, the Rocco Code was not all bad—it also ushered in a range of 
liberal changes,73 then survived several decades of reform by multiple 
democratic governments in Italy that were “avowedly anti-fascist.”74 This, 
at the same time that certain provisions, especially that governing 
perpetration, were voluntarily “transplanted” into adjacent criminal 
systems, most notably in Brazil (see below).75 From a wider vantage point, 
too, the almost invariable irony of episodes of mass violence is that they 
can also contain isolated pockets of liberal development. Some of the most 
important “discoveries” in German criminal science, for instance, were 
first unearthed and applied during the Nazi reign of terror.76 Thus, as a 
general rule, pointing to the fascist origins of the Rocco code is not 
necessarily an indictment of all of the concepts that appear in that code. 
Some, for instance, may have amounted to important normative 
developments that have escaped the gaze of theorists of blame attribution 
in modern ICL. 
 In the case of the unitary theory in particular, the allegations from 
illiberal authoritarianism are clearly specious. As a matter of history, the 
concept’s origins pre and post-date WWII, as Getz, Torp, von Liszt and 
                                                
72 EDGARDO ALBERTO DONNA, TEORIA DEL DELITO Y DE LA PENA 75 (2003) (arguing that 
“due to the connection between the unitary theory and these ideas [Fascism and Nazism] 
today nobody argues them. Because of its obvious danger and its incompatibility with the 
Rule of Law.”); See also, MIGUEL DÍAZ Y GARCÍA CONLLEDO, ESTUDIOS DE FILOSOFÍA 
DEL DERECHO PENAL 75 (2006) (criticizing the unitary theory for similar reasons). 
73 Giuliano Vassalli, The Background of Current Italian Penal Law Reform, in STUDIES 
IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 51–64, 59 (Edward M. Wise & Gerhard O. W. Mueller 
eds., 1975) (“The Rocco Code raised the age of criminal capacity (i.e., the age at which 
punishments may be imposed in cases of recognizable maturity) from nine to fourteen 
years. It expressly authorized detentive punishment aimed solely at the child’s moral 
reeducation and it permitted judicial pardon of the first offense attributable to minors up 
to eighteen years in cases where a detentive punishment not exceeding one year would 
otherwise be imposed.”). 
74 Id., at 52–54. (explaining why the Italian government never enacted a different code 
after the fall of Mussolini). For a brief English-language overview of the changes since 
the Rocco Code, see ASTOLFO DI AMATO, CRIMINAL LAW IN ITALY 43–46 (2011). 
75 See Part IV below.  
76 See, for instance, Markus D. Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal Law: A 
Science of Crime and Punishment, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1049–1071, 1061–1066 (2005) 
(Discussing the significance of Hans Welzel’s theory of finalism in the realm of action, 
which emerged in 1939 and 1940, as “easily the most influential recent theory of German 
criminal law”.)  
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the UIDP show. Substantively, the theory also holds comparative 
advantages in the subjective realm—by maintaining parity in the mental 
elements required for perpetrators and accomplices, the unitary theory 
avoids “modes of liability” acting as a prism that distorts responsibility, 
instead of assigning it in line with the culpability announced in the crime 
(with which both perpetrator and accomplice will be convicted). A 
doctrine like JCEIII has proved highly controversial in international 
criminal law, precisely because it tolerates major cleavages between the 
mental element announced in the mode of liability (foreseeability) and that 
contained in many crimes with which the mode couples (genocide, for 
instance, requires a specific purpose). By solving this problem in a 
defendant’s favor, the unitary theory promotes greater liberalism, 
vindicating the UIDP’s enthusiasm for what they perceived as a genuine 
advance in criminal science. In short, Italian fascism is no blemish on the 
unitary theory’s liberal credentials.  
 Consequently, if ICL is committed to liberal principles of blame 
attribution, it might also choose to transcend the dilemmas it currently 
faces through recourse (back) to the unitary theory of perpetration applied 
at Nuremberg, or even better, towards a more self-conscious variant that is 
crafted by academics in keeping with the origins of the unitary theory 
nationally. After all, the Italian experience is instructive in at least one 
important respect: it suggests that if left unchecked, the very thoughtful 
disagreement that presently exits among leading judges and scholars about 
the dividing line between perpetration and complicity in ICL may not 
come to any widely-shared conclusion, or to say the same thing 
differently, may continue in perpetuity without ever reaching consensus in 
theory or practice. This prospect of disagreement ad infinitum should be 
unsettling to criminal lawyers concerned about the right to a trial based on 
pre-established, stable legal principles rather than a process that involves a 
multiplicity of goal posts that are constantly in motion. At the very least, a 
unitary theory like the one adopted in Italy in 1930 warrants far great 
scholarly engagement as a plausible solution to debates that could well 
turn out to be intractable.  
  
 
V. AUTONOMOUS CHOICE IN BRAZIL 
 
 Until the year 1822, Brazil was a juridical dependency of Portugal. 
In the year 1822, what we now know as Brazil proclaimed its 
independence.77 The first Penal Code of Brazil was promulgated in 1830, 
                                                
77 Celso Campilongo, History and Sources of Brazilian Law, in INTRODUCTION TO 
BRAZILIAN LAW 1–14, 2–3 (Fabiano Deffenti ed., 2011). 
2016]  23 
   
and for better or worse, it maintained the differentiated system of blame 
attribution that was in place under the authority of its erstwhile colonial 
masters, who had in turn borrowed it from the French Penal Code of 1810 
and the Spanish Penal Code of 1822.78 The differentiated system of blame 
attribution continued in the Brazilian Penal Code of 1890, but in 1940, 
Brazilian legislators too would make the transition to a unitary theory of 
perpetration on the strength of the UIDP’s influence and the example set 
by pioneering European nations. Article 25 of the Brazilian Penal Code of 
1940 states that “Whoever, in any way, concurs for the crime is under the 
penalties attributed to it.” There is some debate as to the origins of the 
provision—the received wisdom is that it was borrowed from the Italian 
Rocco Code.79 Costa e Silva, however, argues that the Norwegian Penal 
Code of 1902 inspired the position, since the Norwegian influence was 
evident in Brazil within ordinances prior to that date.80 Whatever the 
dominant source of inspiration, ICL can learn something significant from 
the manner in which the unitary theory was adopted in Brazil—it was 
openly elected not imposed. 
 To those familiar with debates about “modes of liability” in modern 
ICL, the Brazilian refusal to differentiate between forms of attribution will 
appear bizarre, uninformed, or fringe, but in fact the abundance of 
differentiated systems of blame attribution throughout the many systems 
of criminal law globally that informs these perceptions largely has forced 
imposition through colonialism to thank. With the partial exception of 
Italy, the European states that had adopted a unitary theory like that 
employed at Nuremberg and Tokyo were never colonial powers. Hence, 
when Brazil came to adopt the unitary theory of perpetration, it did so far 
more willingly. England, France, Spain and Germany, by contrast, all 
adopted the differentiated system now ascendant in ICL, then 
disseminated this system to the four corners of the global as part of 
European colonial rule. As I have argued elsewhere together with Asad 
Kiyani, the implications for our appreciation of diversity in criminal 
doctrine globally are appreciable—criminal doctrine is not a safe 
                                                
78 NILO BATISTA, CONCURSO DE AGENTES: UMA INVESTIGAÇÃO SOBRE OS PROBLEMAS 
DA AUTORIA E DA PARTICIPAÇÃO NO DIREITO PENAL BRASILEIRO 5 (Liber Juris: 1979). 
On the history of the 1830 criminal code, see Tobias Barretto, Do Mandato Criminal, in 
ESTUDOS DE DIREITO, 223-227 (Rio. 1822). 
79 Batista, supra note 78, at 12. 
80 See ANTONIO JOSÉ DA COSTA E SILVA & LUIZ FERNANDO DA COSTA E SILVA, 
COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO PENAL BRASILEIRO 154 (1967). Batista, however, retorts that 
there is no concrete evidence that such code had exercised any kind of influence in 
Brazil. Id. 
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guarantor of a diversity in underlying social and cultural values.81 The 
Brazilian relationship to the unitary theory is, however, an exception to 
this trend, which ICL may wish to replicate for symbolic as well as 
functional reasons. 
 The truth is that ICL frequently absorbs laws that are colonial 
artifacts, including standards of blame attribution. In the Bagasora Trial 
Judgment, for instance, an ICTR Trial Chamber cited to the Indian Penal 
Code (IPC) of 1860 as the embodiment of Pakistani criminal law in a 
survey of global criminal law.82 In fact, the British used the IPC as a 
template for most all their colonial territories: it was implemented 
verbatim in countries as diverse as Uganda, Singapore and Australia, 
without calibration to local circumstances.83 Similarly, by decree dated 
January 7th, 1886, the Belgian King Leopold promulgated the first Code 
Pénal du Congo. The code involved “vocabulary, formulation, and 
structure that was directly borrowed from Belgian criminal law 
legislation”.84 Independence in 1960 just continued this trend,85 such that 
the leading modern textbook on Congolese criminal law—authored by the 
                                                
81 See James G. Stewart and Asad Kiyani, The Ahistoricism of Legal Pluralism in 
International Criminal Law, forthcoming. 
82 Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 729, 
n.1680 (Dec. 14, 2011). See also, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-23-T& IT-
96-23/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 454 n.1160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 
22, 2001)  (drawing on Pakistani criminal law, and many other national definitions, to 
interpret the scope of rape). 
83 Uganda received the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Criminal Procedure Code in 1897 
and 1902 respectively. See Henry Francis Morris, A History of the Adoption of Codes of 
Criminal Law and Procedure in British Colonial Africa, 1876 − 1935 (1974) 18 J. Afr. 
L. 6, 6 – 7. For discussion of the IPC’s transmission to Singapore, see BARRY WRIGHT, 
STANLEY YEO & WING-CHEONG CHAN, CODIFICATION, MACAULAY AND THE INDIAN 
PENAL CODE: THE LEGACIES AND MODERN CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 2 
(2013). Evidently, the imposition of the IPC was delayed a generation in Australia 
because European settlers baulked at the prospect of adopting criminal law standards that 
were originally crafted for Indians. See Barry Wright, Self-Governing Codifications of 
English Criminal Law and Empire: The Queensland and Canadian Examples (2007) 26 
U. Queensland L. J. 39, 46 – 47.  
84 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, La peine durant la colonisation belge, in LA PEINE - 
PUNISHMENT, 67 (De Boeck Université 1991) (1989) Dembour is also of the opinion that 
at the time of writing, this remained true: “[e] ncore aujourd’hui, le système pénal zaïrois 
reste fortement imprégné des principes que le colonisateur belge a introduits...” 
85 In discussing the history of criminal law in the DRC, Rubbens argues that “[w]ith the 
change to Republican status, the criminal law has scarcely changed.” Antoine Rubbens, 
The Congo Democratic Republic,  in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 14, 16 (1969). Although 
Rubbens was writing in 1969, only a matter of years after independence, more recent 
studies conclude similiarly. Dembour, for instance, is also of the opinion that “[e]ncore 
aujourd’hui, le système pénal zaïrois reste fortement imprégné des principes que le 
colonisateur belge a introduits...” Dembour, supra note 84, at 69. 
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Dean of the School of Law at the Université de Kinshasa—still draws a 
direct line between the current criminal code and Belgian decrees of 20 
January 1940 and 7 January 1886.86  
 To cite one final example from a national system that was not 
formally colonized, the Japanese adopted German notions of 
(differentiated) blame attribution at the turn of the 19th Century to ward 
off full-blown colonial occupation.87 Gunboat diplomacy by Western 
states compelled the Japanese to “elect” a European model of criminal 
justice, such that they would do internally what colonialism would have 
achieved otherwise.88 As Anthony Anghie has explained, the litmus test 
for the type of international recognition that would forestall formal 
colonial rule, known as standards of civilization, demanded that states like 
Japan create “idealized European standards in both their external and, 
more significantly, internal relations.”89 To comply with this exigency, 
Japan initially adopted the French Napoleonic Penal Code (1880) and the 
Code of Criminal Instruction (1880),90 but after only a very brief period in 
effect, the French-based code came to be perceived as overly liberal, and 
incapable of legitimating the structure and values of the imperial regime.91 
In looking for European alternatives, the Japanese found German law 
more advanced and German society more comparable.92 Consequently, 
when one turns to Japanese modes of attribution now, they reveal a 
                                                
86 NYABIRUNGU MWENE SONGA, TRAITÉ DE DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL CONGOLAIS 49 
(2001) (“La loi pénale trouve son siège principal au code pénal. Celui‐ci, qui est 
aujourd’hui porté par le décret du 30 janvier 1940, a eu un début de formulation dans un 
texte législatif du 7 janvier 1886”.). 
87 See SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF JAPAN: THE GENERAL PART 34-35 
(B.J. George trans. 1997). See also, Sally Engle Merry, Colonial and Postcolonial Law, 
in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 569, 570 (Austin Sarat, ed., 
2004). 
88 Ram Prakash Anand, Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, 
Assimilation, Defiance and Confrontation, 5 J HIST. INT’L L. 1, 9–14 (2005). MICHAEL R. 
AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND THE CULTURE 
OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY 1–8 (2006). 
89 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 84 (2007). 
90 Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, 24 (Wilhelm 
Röhl, ed., 2004). 
91 Karl-Friedrich Lenz, Penal Law, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note 
90, at 609–10. See also SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A 
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 9 (2011). 
92 The German code appeared especially relevant to the Japanese context: Germany was a 
relatively new nation, trying to create a federation out of a monarchical system of 
government while reconciling historical and customary practice with statutory law. 
Ronald Frank, Civil Code, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, supra note 90, at 
183. 
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differentiated system quite alien to Anglo-American audiences, which 
mirrors German criminal law and theory more or less precisely.93 
 Through all these processes, not the legislative autonomy apparent 
in Brazil, the differentiated system of blame attribution became most 
prevalent throughout the world. By the same dynamic, it also permeated 
international law. Asad Kiyani and I have spent long hours plotting the 
history of criminal law doctrine at each major interval in the development 
of supranational ICL institutions.94 I will reiterate just one telling anecdote 
here to show how modes of attribution at the international level are 
infused with the same influences that propagated the differentiated model 
throughout much of the world. As Kiyani and I show, in elevating Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) into ICL, the Tadić decision cited a very 
limited set of state practice from “England and Wales, Canada, the United 
States, Australia and Zambia.”95 Regrettably, drawing on just English-
speaking systems effectively double-counted the influence of law 
generated through British colonialism: once in the metropole then several 
times again within former colonies the parent system had constructed in 
its own image.  
 Ironically, the same dangers are evident within judicial opposition to 
aspects of JCE. A decision of the Extraordinary Criminal Chambers of 
Cambodia (ECCC) rejecting one component of Tadić’s rendering of JCE 
pointed to the absence of this aspect of the concept in Cambodian criminal 
law.96 Yet, as authority for this more restrictive reading of JCE, the ECCC 
cited a French text on the Cambodian Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal, 
which explained Cambodian modes of attribution in terms that reflected 
                                                
93 To cite but a few illustrations, Japanese criminal law adopts a German tripartite 
structure, differentiating the paradigm of the crime from justifications and excuses, 
whereas Anglo-American systems amalgamates the latter two of these categories. Dando, 
supra note 87, at 3–4. Following their German inspiration, Japanese criminal law also 
includes dolus eventualis as the lowest sub-category of intention, in contrast with Anglo-
American criminal law, whose closest equivalent is a stand-alone mental element called 
recklessness. For the Japanese treatment of dolus eventualis as intention, see ibid, at 154–
55. Normally, recklessness is not assimilated to intention in English-speaking systems as 
occurs in Germany, and by mimicry now, Japan. Finally, Japanese criminal also rejects 
the objective theory of perpetration in favor of quintessentially German accounts of the 
dividing line between perpetration and complicity—while Anglo-American criminal law 
(unconvincingly) always treats the person doing the killing as the perpetrator, both 
Japanese and German criminal law do not. Compare Dando, supra note 87, at 217-219, 
with MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 156-166 (2008). 
94 See The Ahistoricism of Legal Pluralism in International Criminal Law, supra note 81. 
95 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), ¶ 224. 
96 See Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav (Duch Case), Decision on the Appeals Against the 
Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), Case No: 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38),  (May 20, 2010), ¶ 41. 
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French law par excellence.97 This parallelism was largely unsurprising 
since French criminal law was introduced into Cambodia as early as 1929 
as part of colonial control over “French Indochina,” and French law 
remains the dominant legal influence in Cambodia to this day.98 The net 
effect, given that this anecdote is in step with a global trend, is that the 
existence and shape of international “modes of liability” is often a product 
of (competing) colonial legacies rather than a volitional adoption of 
criminal law standards among affected populations. Through these ignoble 
processes, then, the differentiated system of blame attribution has gained 
ascendancy globally. 
 By contrast, the Brazilian choice to adopt the unitary theory of 
perpetration appears to epitomize a far greater degree of autonomy, 
without the layers of coercion that are woven through the history of the 
differentiated system.  
 
 
VI. AVOIDING THE RECHARACTERIZATION PROBLEM IN AUSTRIA 
 
 In 1975, the Austrian legislature adopted a unitary theory of 
perpetration too, chiefly due to the seminal work of Austrian criminal 
theorist Diethelm Kienapfel.99 Like its forbearers elsewhere, the prior 
Austrian Criminal Code of 1852 contained differentiated “modes of 
liability.” At the same time, the earlier Austrian system adopted the 
conceptually bizarre practice of assigning equal punishments to all 
participants within the confines of a general part that differentiated 
between different forms of participation, as is now the case in England, 
France, and the ICC.100 The peculiarity, to draw again on George Fletcher, 
is that this back-end equivalence arguably renders the front-end division 
redundant.101 When the Austrian Commission of Criminal Law was 
                                                
97 Id. 
98 Phann Vanrath, The Basics of Substantial Cambodian Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION 
TO CAMBODIAN LAW 198, 201 (Hor Peng, Kong Phallack, & Jörg Menzel, eds., 2010) 
(noting as well that French criminal law was in force in Cambodia since 1929 and that 
the 2009 code was drafted jointly by Cambodian officials and French experts). 
99 DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT (1971). 
100  WEIßER, supra note 12, at 126. For further discussions of this history, see WOLFGANG 
SCHÖBERL, DIE EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT ALS EUROPÄISCHES MODELL: DIE 
STRAFRECHTLICHE BETEILIGUNGSREGELUNG IN ÖSTERREICH UND DEN NORDISCHEN 
LÄNDERN 50–56 (1 ed. 2006); ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 177–187. 
101 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 651 (1978) (in discussing the French 
and English statutes differentiating perpetrators from accomplices then assigning them 
the same maximum penalties, Fletcher asks “why the French and Anglo-American 
systems ever recognized distinctions among perpetrators, joint perpetrators and 
accomplices.”). 
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established soon after WWII to rethink the earlier code, doing away with 
this normative oddity was high among their priorities. Strangely, however, 
the same oddity is retained in the ICC Statute—the ICC sets out a 
differentiated system of blame attribution without formally requiring a 
reduction in an accomplice’s sentence, and thus far, the ICC’s various 
Chambers have opined that complicity need not warrant a reduction of any 
sort.102  
 I seize, however, upon a different point of commonality between 
modern ICL and Austria pre-unitary theory. One of the key factors in the 
unitary theory’s favor, which carried great weight in the Austrian decision 
to abandon “modes of liability” was that the new unitary theory precluded 
the possibility of appealing against the stipulation of a “mode of liability” 
if the classification changed late in a trial.103 Since all forms of 
participation were substantively identical, there would be no prejudice to 
the defendant if the form of perpetration was wrongly determined at the 
outset.104 By chance, this coincides perfectly with the Regulation 55 
conundrum the ICC now faces, which has caused a great deal of 
consternation in judicial and extra-judicial writing. I pause, then, to 
introduce the current dynamics of the Regulation 55 debate 
internationally, showing once again how curiously, history sometimes 
repeats. 
Regulation 55 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides 
that a “Chamber may change the legal characterization of facts to accord 
with the crimes […] or to accord with the form of participation of the 
accused […] without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in 
the charges and any amendments to the charges.”105 The rule has proved 
controversial in practice, with respect to the ability to legally 
recharacterize crimes as well as forms of participation. As regards the 
former, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber invoked Regulation 55 to 
recharacterize an armed conflict in the DRC as international rather than 
                                                
102 The Katanga Sentencing Decision states that “[a]s stated by the Chamber in its 
Judgment, article 25 [of the ICC Statute] merely identifies and lists various forms of 
illegal conduct and, in that respect, the proposed distinction between the liability of a 
perpetration of a crime and that of an accessory to a crime does not in any way amount to 
a hierarchy of blameworthiness, let alone prescribe, even by implication, a scale of 
punishments.” See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision 
on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, 23 May 2014, ¶ 61. I am grateful to 
Barbora Holá for her very helpful advice about this issue.  
103 WEIßER, supra note 12, at 143. 
104 Id. at 143. 
105 Regulations of the Court, Adopted by the judges of the Court on 26 May 2004, 
Official Documents of the ICC, ICC-BD/01-01-04. 
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non-international.106 The test’s larger controversies, however, have come 
in cases involving the recharacterization of forms of participation, 
sometimes well after in-court proceedings have come to a close,107 thereby 
emulating the very problem Austrians sought to resolve through recourse 
to a unitary theory of perpetration.  
 On 21 September 2012, after the prosecution case had closed and 
the Court was over a month into the Defense case, an ICC Trial Chamber 
gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55 that it could choose to modify the 
legal characterization of the facts that had emerged in one-time DRC 
Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba’s trial. Instead of requiring Bemba’s 
“knowledge” of his subordinates’ crimes for the purposes of superior 
responsibility, the Court intimated that “should have known” would 
suffice.108 Then, far more controversially, six months after both the 
prosecution and defense cases had ended, a Trial Chamber notified the 
parties that it intended to consider Congolese warlord Germain Katanga’s 
liability as an entirely lesser form of participation, not co-perpetration as 
he was charged with.109 One of the judges in the case rebuked the decision 
severely in dissent, arguing that it went “well beyond any reasonable 
application of the provision and fundamentally encroaches upon the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.”110 With one notable exception, academic 
studies of the topic have mirrored the judicial disquiet,111 but few have 
                                                
106 Lubanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 58, ¶ 156. By chance, I also think the 
difference between international and non-international armed conflict should be 
abandoned, especially for the purposes of war crimes in ICL. See James G. Stewart, 
Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A 
Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313–350 (2003). 
107 Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary have written an excellent report summarizing 
the cases to date and considering their implications for rights of the accused. See SUSANA 
SÁCOUTO & KATHERINE CLEARY, REGULATION 55 AND THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2013), 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/Report17.pdf (last visited Oct 
23, 2015). 
108 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties 
and Participant that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May be Subject to Change in 
Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of The Regulations of The Court, Case No.: ICC-
01/05-01/08-2324, (Sept. 21, 2012), ¶ 5. 
109 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the 
Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the 
Charges Against the Accused Persons, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 6 (notifying 
the parties that “Katanga’s mode of participation could be considered from a different 
perspective from that underlying the Confirmation Decision.”) 
110 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, Mar 17, 2014, ¶ 1.  
111 Carsten Stahn has offered the leading justification of Regulation 55. See Carsten 
Stahn, Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts in the ICC System: A 
Portrayal of Regulation 55, 16 CRIM. L. FORUM 1–31 (2005). For other excellent 
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recognized that some jurisdictions have resolved the larger part of the 
problem structurally. 
For instance, in an excellent article criticizing the recharacterization 
of modes of participation at the ICC, Kevin Jon Heller opines that 
Regulation 55’s shortcomings are manifest: “the defence will now have to 
rebut each and every possible form of complicity during trial, because it 
cannot be sure which one(s) the Trial Chamber will ultimately deem to be 
the proper legal characterization of the facts.”112 Notice, however, that this 
problem mostly recedes into obscurity once standards of responsibility are 
condensed into a single form. In other words, the factor that makes 
recharacterization simultaneously desirable and problematic for forms of 
participation is that it is possible to talk about “each and every possible 
form of complicity” (or perpetration) at all. If this troublesome doctrinal 
pluralism is acknowledged and withdrawn, modes of participation would 
not have different substantive contours. As such, the parties would be left 
to contest whether the accused made a substantial causal contribution to a 
crime with the requisite mental element announced in it, and most 
significantly, these elements could never shift. As the Austrians foresaw, 
the need to recharacterize forms of participation at least would be almost 
entirely obviated. 
Once again, the UIDP played a vital role in paving the way for 
Austria to escape these types of problems, even though the doctrinal shift 
from differentiated to unitary took place over seventy years after the 
UIDP’s famous endorsement of the theory. Interestingly, the Austrian 
legal change of heart seemed less a stubborn insistence on autonomy from 
the highly influential German neighbor, and more the product of a 
sustained philosophical commitment over that long duration. While 
German criminal theory engulfed systems of criminal justice that were far 
more distant in language, geography and culture (like Japan and now the 
International Criminal Court), Austrian academics kept the unitary theory 
alive through continual debate. One leading Austrian commentator 
concludes that “it was their constant publications on unitary perpetration 
theories that reached the result that (German) ideas of accessory 
participation (i.e. derivative perpetration of accomplices) could never 
                                                                                                                     
commentary, see Margaux Reynauld, The “Fair Fight” Against Impunity: A Proposal on 
the Modalities for Implementation of Regulation 55, , http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334803; 
SÁCOUTO AND CLEARY, supra note 105. Dov Jacobs, A Shifting Scale of Power: Who is 
in Charge of the Charges at the International Criminal Court?,  in THE ASHGATE 
RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
205–222 (William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott, & Niamh Hayes eds., 2013). 
112 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘A Stick to Hit the Accused With’: The Legal Recharacterization of 
Facts under Regulation 55, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 981, 1002 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). 
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really become domestic in Austria.”113 In my humble view, they should 
not have become international either. Nonetheless, that international 
courts and tribunals have adopted a differentiated system does not mean 
ICL has crossed the Rubicon; each of the national systems I discuss here 
replaced differentiated systems of blame attribution with unitary 
alternatives, even when the former appeared to be firmly entrenched 
within the respective legal cultures. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 For someone familiar with modes of participation in contemporary 
ICL, reading the history of the unitary theory of perpetration will probably 
produce a strange sense of déjà vu. So many of the problems that bedevil 
this aspect of modern ICL were confronted and overcome when a set of 
European nations followed the advice of the UIDP, then the largest 
international congregation of criminal law theorists globally, by 
dismantling their differentiated system of blame attribution in favor of a 
unitary alternative. In this article, I have sought to pay homage to 
Professor Mirjan Damaška’s catalytic effect on my professional life and 
scholarly agenda by again suggesting that ICL should undertake a similar 
turn, such that responsibility for international crimes would mean 
something clear, stable, and conceptually defensible throughout the many 
jurisdictions capable of trying these offenses. There is, no doubt, much 
critical scholarly work still to be done to test the buoyancy of this vessel, 
but as I hope the foregoing has shown, our understandable affinity for the 
differentiated model presently in force is mostly a byproduct of our 
socialization in systems of criminal law from powerful Western states. If I 
have exceeded myself, this piece will have challenged these sorts of 
received wisdoms for others half as well as Damaška’s masterpiece once 
did for me.  
     
  
   
 
                                                
113 SCHÖBERL, supra note 98, at 31. 
